Excerpt from the conclusion of Chapter 1. Solving The Mystery of Mason’s Obscurity In American History.

From forthcoming GabbyPress book: George Mason’s America: The State Sovereignty Alternative to Madison’s Centralized American Ruling Class Aristocracy.

Conclusion to chapter 1

Mason has been overlooked and underappreciated by academic scholars of American political history because the academic community has a cowardly blind spot about describing social class conflict in American society.

For those historians, it is intellectually easier and politically correct to write American history from the perspective of “We, the people,” where there is no social conflict between elites and common citizens.

Part of the perspective of the academic community is derived from Madison’s emphasis on citing the writings of Montesquieu regarding the small versus the extended republic.

Montesquieu wrote that in the extended republic there would not be commonly shared cultural values among citizens. Madison corrupted the principles of Montesquieu by suggesting that his idea of an extended republic was actually better than Montesquieu.

What Madison succeeded in doing in his extended republic was to make certain that common citizens would never form a coherent social class consciousness, while at the same time, providing the ruling class with a centralized unelected position of power, in the Senate, with no term limits.

There were not commonly shared cultural values between the ruling class and common citizens, in 1787, and there are no commonly held cultural values today, between Marxist Democrats and natural rights conservatives.

A more truthful interpretation of the Constitutional Convention is that Madison and the 38 elites who signed the secret document staged a successful coup that overthrew the state sovereignty constitution of the Articles of Confederation.

The addition of the sociological factor of social class awareness of Madison’s natural aristocracy explains how and why the American constitution was created and evolved.

The tiny financial faction of American natural elites, in 1787, had a coherent ideological framework, and the financial resources to implement their cultural values in  Madison’s convention.

The financial interests and political cultural values of the common citizens were not organized politically, and those social interests were not rich enough to fund their own social class awareness, even if they had actually created a social class consciousness.

The scholarly work of Charles Beard, and much later, Gordon Wood, would have been more accurate if their work had been placed into the two-class social conflict model of history.

Beard provided detailed analysis of the financial wealth of the elite, without providing the theoretical framework of sociological class consciousness of the elite.

Critics of both Beard and Wood attempt to slime them both with the epithet of Marxism.

Using the epithet of Marxism to brand the two historians is another form of social cancel culture, just like Mason has been cancelled by the American academic community.

The social class conflict model was developed as a part of the political economic theory of classical economics, primarily by Adam Smith, in the Wealth of Nations, in 1776, about 100 years before Marx wrote Das Kapital, in 1867.

In our book, we revive the political economy tradition of Adam Smith by extending the work of James Buchanan to explain how a constitution sets the rules of the game.

In our explanation of Madison’s constitution, it set the unfair and centralized rules of the game by eviscerating the decentralized framework of state sovereignty, and replacing sovereignty in a powerful, centralized myth of “We, the people, controlled by the Ruling Class.

After the initial rules had been established, Hamilton and the other Ruling Class elite cohorts used the rules to maximize their own welfare by establishing institutional monetary and tax mechanisms, like the First Bank, the Second Bank, and the Federal Reserve Bank, to direct benefits to their own social class.

As Buchanan points out, the political economic model is a two-step process.

The two-step process, in a legitimate political authority, begins with the consent of the governed granting a portion of their original natural rights to the state in order to obtain protection of equal natural rights for all citizens.

Madison’s constitution never obtained the citizen’s original grant of consent.

In the one state that allowed citizens to vote on ratification, the citizens voted 98% against ratification, an accurate reflection of how common citizens in all 13 states viewed Madison’s document

And, following Buchanan, the citizens were never granted the opportunity to provide on-going consent, or to withdraw original consent, as if that consent had actually been obtained in the corrupt ratification process.

The only element of on-going consent in Madison’s constitution is the citizen’s ability to vote every four years on the elites who will rule them.

And, that last shred of legitimate citizen consent was eradicated in the Democrat Marxist coup, of 2020.

Voting, and elections in America, are no longer a legitimate and authentic reflection of the will of the majority.

And, without legitimate citizen consent, there is no representative republic.