Individual Rights and the Promotion of the Sovereign National Economic Interest

Laurie Thomas Vass, The Citizens Liberty Party

June 18, 2018

Introduction.

Beginning around 1796, Madison’s Constitution generated periodic, recurring national economic crises, at an interval of about every 10 years.

The instability in the U. S. economy is precipitated by speculation in assets, inflation, monetary instability, and tax and fiscal policies that adversely affect national aggregate demand.

The financial elites in America are the economic agents who precipitate the economic instability with their asset speculation, and the concomitant power to affect monetary policy, to their own benefit.

Because Madison’s Constitution stacked the deck against common citizens, they have suffered needless financial distress during the economic crises. Madison’s system of checks and balances left common citizens defenseless to represent their own social class interests in the economic downturns.

In contrast, the natural aristocracy have sailed through most recessions largely unscathed because Madison’s rules tended to insulate the elite from the consequences of their wild speculative schemes and unbalanced monetary policy.

Because of their unbalanced constitutional power, they have been able to use the agencies and resources of government to avoid financial distress.

As in the 2008 case of the U. S. Government bailouts of banks and global corporations, throughout the history of the nation, Madison’s rules allowed the elites to manipulate government tax and financial policy to benefit the elite financial interests.

Eventually, the flaws in Madison’s rules allowed the corporate and financial elite to disconnect their government welfare benefits from the consent of the governed.

The correct description of this political arrangement is called “centralized elite tyranny.” It is also called “the deep state.”

In his excellent article titled, “America’s Ruling Class — And the Perils of Revolution,” Angelo M. Codevilla explains how the elites in the swamp operate their tyranny, outside the rule of law.

Codevilla used the example of how the elites used tax money to bail themselves out of the global financial crisis, in the Fall of 2008.

Codevilla wrote, “the leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties, agreed that spending $700 billion to buy the investors’ “toxic assets” was the only alternative to the U.S. economy’s “systemic collapse.” In this, President George W. Bush and his would-be Republican successor John McCain agreed with the Democratic candidate, Barack Obama.”

The decisions by the elites, in 2008, were reached in secret. The decisions primarily benefited three large investment banks, who are the main movers and shakers of the unelected, unaccountable, deep state agents in the swamp.

The reason that the deep state elites in the swamp operate their cabal in secret is to direct the world’s economic and financial benefits to themselves.

Codevilla’s analysis explains that within Madison’s two political party British social class system, the Vichy Republicans collaborate with Obama’s socialist Democrat Party to serve the corporate elite interests.

As he notes, “No prominent Republican challenged the ruling class’s continued claim of superior insight, nor its denigration of the American people as irritable children who must learn their place. The Republican Party did not disparage the ruling class, because most of its officials are or would like to be part of it.”

In other words, there are not two political parties that represent distinct social classes, as intended by Madison’s British mixed government model. Both political parties, for different reasons, promote globalization of the American economy, to the detriment of the sovereign national economic interest.

The elites in the swamp, under Madison’s flawed constitution, did not need to capture political control in all 250 metro regions, they just needed to get unchecked political control of both political parties in Washington, in order to collude and rig the global economic system for their own interests.

Globalization of the American economy, in other words, should be seen in the bigger context of the rule of law and the evisceration of the sovereignty of America, as a distinct nation.

The three large global investment banks have a strangle-hold on the rate of capital investment  in the U. S. domestic economy that allows the bankers to manage the global economy in order to reward themselves.

They choose when, how, and where capital investment will occur in the global economy.

Totalitarian political control of the rate of capital investment, in the hands of the global investment banks, reduces the need for the elites to seek any form of the consent of the governed to exert total control over the economy.

Under a different set of constitutional rules, a different set of national economic outcomes would be obtained.

There is no justification for Madison’s rules that inflict damage on common citizens by precipitating perpetual cyclical economic crisis.

The economic instability in the American economy is not a “naturally-occurring” adjustment to economic equilibrium. It is a Madison-made unfair and unbalanced system of rules that benefits the “natural aristocracy.”

Madison’s rules could be replaced with constitutional rules that did not generate economic instability.

James Buchanan, the late professor of economics at James Mason University, explained how the constitutional rules affected the nation’s rate of economic growth.

Under one set of constitutional rules, Buchanan predicted certain types of economic outcomes. Under a different configuration of rules, Buchanan predicted another type of economic outcome.

Buchanan argued that there is only one, unique, configuration of constitutional rules that leads the nation to optimum rates of national economic growth. These rules aim at maximum individual freedom to allow individuals to seek their own happiness.

Following the work of Buchanan, this seminar compares and contrasts the economic outcomes under 3 sets of constitutional rules:

  • The Articles of Confederation, first created in 1776, and adopted, by 13 states in 1781, as the nation’s first constitution.
  • Madison’s Constitution of 1789.
  • The natural rights constitution of the Liberty States of America, first proposed in 2018.

The three constitutional arrangements can be compared based upon how each constitution resolves 4 national economic growth issues that generate conflicts of financial interests among political and social classes.

Summary of the Four Conflicts of Interest Between Constitutional Rules.

Type of Conflict                 National Sovereign Interest    Global Corporate Interest

Flows of technical information within national sovereign borders. Open flows to create wide range of new ventures. Private, proprietary flows to absorb internal benefits of technology innovation
Flows of new technology ventures creation. Open flows, maximum new venture creation. Limited flows in order to protect global corporate core competency.
Pathway of technical change. Maximum technical change and greatest diversity in new venture creation. Technical change directed to global corporation’s core competency.
Cultural/political values. Individual freedom, reward based upon individual merit, maximum individual risk-taking. Globalist/collectivist values oriented to using government to promote resolution of market-based conflicts.

One set of interests promotes the national sovereign economic interest.

The other side promotes corporate globalism, which directs economic benefits to global banks and corporations.

About 15% of the U. S. domestic economy benefits from the global elite tyranny.

There are three major primary investment banks that direct the global activity and only about 1500 large corporations that are connected to the global financial transactions.

The other 85% of the population are powerless to change this status quo because Madison’s rules provide no mechanism for the citizens to regain the consent of the governed.

Part 2. Buchanan’s Constitutional Economics.

Buchanan explained that every set of constitutional rules has an internal end-goal to which the rules are directed.

In Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty, (1999), Buchanan relies on a philosophy of logic to explain how the end goals of a constitution, clearly stated in the preamble, create the binding allegiance of citizens to follow the rule of law.

“Uncertainty about just where one’s own interest will lie in a sequence of plays or rounds will lead a rational person, from his own interest, to prefer rules and arrangements, or constitutions that will seem fair, no matter what final positions he might occupy.”

His first principle of logic is that all individuals are rational in the pursuit of their own sovereign life mission,

In The Theory of Public Choice, (1972), he defines an individual not so much from the perspective of insight-imagination, but from the brain’s rational choice attribute. He states that, “…we can simply define a person in terms of his set of preferences, his utility function. This function defines or describes a set of possible trade-offs among alternatives for potential choice.”

In The Reason of Rules. (2000), Buchanan explains the importance of how citizens provide prior consent to follow the rules that they give to themselves. “Just conduct,” writes Buchanan, “consists of behavior that does not violate rules to which one has given prior consent.”

In other words, rather than relying on the separation of powers to deal with the problem of special interests, as Madison did, Buchanan relies upon the rationality of self-interest as a force that binds individuals to society as a process of rationally minimizing risk in uncertain decision making environments.

In leaving the state of nature, and forming a constitution, Buchanan explains, individuals are placed in a position of uncertainty in the outcome of their life’s mission. No individual knows in advance where the individual may end up, given the choice between one set of constitutional rules or another.

His logic of individual rationality is that any individual, with a rational self-interest, would choose fair rules for all, aimed at the greatest freedom for all.

In constitutional decision-making under uncertainty, individuals would seek rules that had maximum equal rights for all, with special privileges for none. The end goal, or telos, of the constitution, in this case of rational self-interest, is individual freedom.

Buchanan wrote, “To the extent that Madison’s constitution commands little respect, it is, in part, because it fails in its function of limiting the scope of both governmental and private intrusion into what are widely held to be protected spheres of activity.”

Madison’s constitution was not based upon the prior consent of the citizens, while the Articles of Confederation obtained the prior consent of the 13 states, who promised to be bound by the perpetual rules.

Madison’s flaw of not obtaining the prior consent of the citizens was compounded by his deliberately vague statement of the end goals in the Preamble. “To form a more perfect union” could mean anything, as Thomas Paine and George Mason, pointed out, at the time.

There was no “We, the people,” at the creation of Madison’s constitution. There were only 51 self-selected political and financial elites, who met in secret to draft the rules. “We, the people is actually just 51 elites who had the audacity to call themselves, “We, the people.”

While Madison promised that the central government would not operate directly on citizens in each state, his constitution allowed the central government to operate directly upon the citizens, without providing the mechanism for citizens to enforce the rule of law on the law-givers.

The operation of the central government directly on the citizens violated Buchanan’s first principle of justice.

In The Reason of Rules, Buchanan and Brennan write, “Our specific claim is that justice takes its meaning from the rules for the social order within which notions of justice are to be applied. To appeal to considerations of justice is to appeal to relevant rules. These rules provide the framework within which patterns of distributional end states emerge from the interaction of persons who play various complex functional roles.”

In other words, fair distribution of income and wealth, under Buchanan, is obtained through just rules of financial and economic exchange.

Buchanan’s interpretation of justice as fair rules is dramatically different than Madison’s rules of civil procedure. Madison’s notion of justice relies on a set of judicial elites who judge the fairness of welfare outcomes, after a transaction has occurred, and a dispute arises between the parties.

Once confirmed by the Senate, the Federal judicial elites can not be removed by the citizens because the judges are appointed for life. Their decisions about just outcomes, throughout U. S. economic history, have been slanted to the benefit of the elites.

Buchanan applies his concept of justice to his suggestions about the relationship between free markets and governmental power. He states that “…for most persons, the independence offered by the presence of market alternatives offers the maximal liberty possible. But we have not yet designed institutions that will satisfy the individual’s search for community in the impersonal setting of the market order without, at the same time, undermining the very independence that this order afford.”

The point he is making is that a certain type of institutional arrangement in government rules damages individual freedom gained in the free market. This lesson has been learned over and over again, by the common citizens, as in the case of farmers during the debt-peonage era.

The farmers were making a moral argument about justice and fairness. The Federal judges were answering the argument from the perspective of economic rules of civil procedure. Madison’s constitution does not contain principles of justice and fairness.

It only contains rules of civil procedure. In the application of those rules, taking away the land of the farmers was a civil right of the bankers.

Buchanan addressed this question of fairness in his book The Theory of Public Choice, when he described the difference between “economic man,” and “moral man.”

Economic man, according to Buchanan, is defined by his utility function, whose variables are weighted according to their contribution to monetary wealth. “Economic man’s  behavior,” notes Buchanan, “in the economic relationship is not influenced by ethical or moral considerations that serve to constrain his pursuit of his objectively defined interest.”

Under a different constitutional arrangement, economic man’s pursuit of unfair advantage would be tempered by the presence of moral man’s principles of justice in the distribution of welfare benefits.

As Buchanan notes, the welfare outcomes that the elites seek to maximize are their own, not the welfare outcomes that benefit the national sovereign economic interests. Once the elites in the swamp obtained unchecked power, they were free to escape from the burdens of the democratic consent of the governed.

Madison’s flaw creates a defect in American model of democratic representative government.

Buchanan and Brennan wrote ex­tensively on the theory of democracy as it relates to the development of fair economic laws and financial rules. They emphasized that the development of fair rules is a political process, that is mediated by democratic procedures, in which the citizens express the consent of the governed.

In other words, after the citizens gave their prior consent to the initial creation of the rules, fair rules would allow them to give ongoing consent, after the government had been established.

Appeals to justice take place within the political system of democratic representative government, and Jefferson wrote that citizens have a God-given right to alter or abolish those rules when their application becomes destructive of the ends for which it was created.

Madison’s flaw was to leave out of his constitution the end goals for which the government was created. His constitution established civil rules of procedure, without end goals.

The subsumed unstated end goals turned out to be rules that benefited the 51 elites, who met in secret, and called themselves “We, the people.”

Madison’s constitution ended up in a centralized elite tyranny that benefited the globalist corporate elite interests and did not promote of the sovereign national economic interest.

As Buchanan has pointed out, a different configuration of constitutional rules would produce different economic outcomes. The single, unique configuration of rules that produce maximum economic outcomes, according to Buchanan, were fair rules of exchange, based upon maximum individual freedom.

Part 3. Individual Freedom and National Economic Growth.

The relationship between constitutional individual freedom and national economic growth is through the ability of individuals to create new technology ventures that commercialize new technology products.

The new technology products create new future markets that create new flows of income.

Technical change causes new income flows to be created where none had existed before. Part of the new income is a result of increased productivity, meaning that output increases with reduced inputs in the production unit.

Part of the new income is in the form of profits related to new goods produced by new production units.

Another part of the income is in the form of wages and salaries paid to people who work in the new units, who spend their incomes in the local economy, creating income and employment multipliers.

There is nothing preordained or certain in the outcome of technical change that it would automatically create more future wealth or greater income.

Schumpeter explained that there are social, political, and economic forces that favor one type of technical change, and there are other political forces that favor status quo technical change.

National economic growth is a contingent outcome of the type of technical change, in the economy. It occurs in some nations, but not in others.

In The Lever of Riches: Technological Creativity and Economic Progress, (1990), Joel Mokyr reviews the relationship between economic development and technological innovation by first raising the question why economic growth occurs in some societies and not in others.

According to Mokyr, economic growth results from open flows of innovation, which only occur under one configuration of constitutional rules advocated by Buchanan.

According to Mokyr, technological progress tends to occur in national economies which have well-educated citizens, who are deeply engaged in the economic and political decisions of their communities.

In such a society, the appearance of technical progress is rapidly diffused, and as the knowledge embodied in the change spreads among citizens, it creates imbalances and bottlenecks in existing interindustry relations.

These imbalances are important as an explanation of technical change because they create the conditions for new interindustry relationships as the imbalances and bottlenecks are overcome.

The new interindustry relationships tend to create new sources of income that are not dependent on the older interindustry relationships.

Mokyr found in his historical review that certain political organizations and social groups are opposed to open knowledge flows because that type of technical change would tend to disrupt the advantages they receive from the existing status quo arrangement of power.

The status quo of power is what Madison’s constitutional rules are designed to protect. In other words, Madison’s constitution protects the same set of elite corporate classes in America today, as it protected the natural aristocracy, in 1787.

The accumulation of technological knowledge and the pace of technical change, are contingent outcomes of the social and political institutional structure of a region. For technological progress to occur, according to Mokyr, “…it must be born into a socially sympathetic environment.”

The strangle-hold of the investment banks on the rate of capital investment is a tool of control over the pace of technical change.

The Articles of Confederation and the natural rights constitution of the Liberty States of America create this type of individualistic, open flow of knowledge that is sympathetic to technical change.

Nothing about this economic relationship between technical change and economic growth has changed since 1957, when Robert Solow published his research, “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function.”

While conventional macro economic theory of productivity improvements can explain around 25% of national economic growth, Solow showed that technical change explained about 75% of American economic growth, over 4 decades.

Joseph Schumpeter had explained, 20 years before Solow, that individualistic entrepreneurial technical change produced certain types of economic outcomes, while corporate monopolistic technical change produced a different outcome.

These two types of technical change roughly parallel the two types of constitutions under consideration in this article. Madison’s constitution ended up promoting global corporate technical change.

Buchanan’s constitutional rules, as applied in the Articles of Confederation and the natural rights constitution of the Liberty States of America promote individualistic, entrepreneurial technical change.

The two types of technical change are the major variables in understanding the resolution of the 4 conflicts of interest in the diagram, above in Part 1.

The type of technical change influences the path of national economic development. The two types of technical change tend to diffuse knowledge along different business-social networks.

One type of technical exchange produces open flows of knowledge. The other type of technical change diffuses technical knowledge in closed, proprietary flows of knowledge.

Flows of technical information within national sovereign borders. Open flows to create wide range of new ventures. Private, proprietary flows to absorb internal benefits of technology innovation

The entire process of economic growth caused by open flows of knowledge can be seen as the shifting of the national production function outward, which is reflected by changing technical coefficients in a dynamic input-output model the national economy.

Economic growth caused by technical change is a result of capital investments made by entrepreneurs in new production units create new interindustry relationships and new market relationships that did not exist before.

The new ventures produce products whose supply varies, according to the feedback mechanism of consumer preferences.

The consumer demand is evolving over time and could not have been predicted by the entrepreneur because part of the new demand is based upon relationships in complementary markets, that did not exist, and are being created as a result of technical change.

One predominate conflict of interest between the globalist model and the individualist model concerns a stable monetary system.

Technical change in the individualist model requires individual risk-taking, rewards based upon individual merit, and individual creativity.

A stable national monetary policy provides a context of financial stability for the entrepreneur as he makes his guesses about the future demand for his products. If the supply of money is stable or rising, the economic conditions are favorable for continued technical change.

As long as the entrepreneur can see the conditions of stability, he has the confidence to make his guess and move forward with his capital investment into a very uncertain future.

Money supply is linked to technical change through its effect on entrepreneur’s expectations on the future.

If the entrepreneur does not see stable economic conditions sufficient to make his new investment, then the rate of capital investment will cause economic decline in the future because future intermediate markets of relationships and complementary ventures are not created, that result from capital investment.

Capital investments today by entrepreneurs affects the rate of profits and the rate of economic growth in the future. National monetary policy can create the conditions for either national economic stagnation and decline or future economic growth.

The speculative investments in assets by the elites creates unstable economic conditions. For elites, the manipulation of the money supply and interest rates is seen as a tool to use to bail themselves out of the economic crisis that they create.

In the closed, corporate global model of technical change, the production coefficients do not change, for long periods of time, because the income and employment multipliers are absorbed internally within the global corporate business networks.

In the closed, corporate model, as the eight years of Obama show, or the past 40 years of the EU, economic growth stagnates at a very low levels of economic activity.

In his early writings, Joseph Schumpeter described the internal dynamic forces of the free market as akin to the “gales of creative destruction.” There is nothing about the “gales of creative destruction” that is appealing to global  financial interests who benefit from a stable technical change status quo.

In his later work, he became pessimistic about the trends that he saw in the free market which he thought were leading to oligopoly and monopoly. He was concerned that the dominant powerful firms would limit technological innovations in order to reap greater profits from their status quo position.

The business-social network that Schumpeter identified with monopoly was comprised of old production units, commercial bankers, institutional money, and senior management of branch plants of multi-national corporations.

Schumpeter explained that this corporate network had financial interests in maintaining the status quo because uncertainty upset the flow of benefits that they achieve from the status quo arrangement of power.

In Schumpeter’s economic model of 1935, commercial bankers “…supplied the entrepreneurs with purchasing power by furnishing them with credit. Moreover, because bankers are not able to create credit in unlimited quantities, they have to select from among the investment plans put forward by entrepreneurs that they regard as desirable or likely to succeed.”

Schumpeter continued, “The direction that the economy will follow will depend on the investment plans that are chosen, and therefore, it is bankers who constitute the selection committees for investment plans; they are the helmsmen of the capitalist economy.”

Schumpeter feared that significant technological innovations would only occur in large multi-national corporations that had sufficient resources to conduct extensive research and development.

Schumpeter thought that the multi-national corporations would be motivated to use technical change to enhance their monopoly position in the world market.

Schumpeter offered the most compelling explanation of the current global corporatist political deep state political strategy. In the current global economy, directed by 3 large investment banks, global corporations use the pace of technical change to enhance their monopoly power.

Charles Kindleberger, in World Economic Primacy, (1996), noted how a certain set of cultural values tended to favor an attitude towards technical innovation. He characterized this attitude as the “…capability and will of individuals, companies and governments to break free of existing habits, perceptions, institutions, and task allocations, in order to revise them in light of constantly changing circumstances and developments.”

Like Mokyr, Buchanan and Schumpeter, Kindleberger perceived a type of contingent relationship between the cultural values that support individual freedom and national economic growth.

He found that individuals in some societies have the freedom to break free of existing habits, perceptions, and institutions in order to revise their behavior in light of changing economic conditions.

In other societies, Kindleberger found a type of economic control exercised over individuals that inhibited changed behavior. Some political organizations with a vested financial interest in maintaining the status quo arrangement of power tended to oppose technical change, and thus acted to limit individual economic freedom.

Cultural/political values. Individual freedom, reward based upon individual merit, maximum individual risk-taking. Globalist/collectivist values oriented to using government to promote resolution of market-based conflicts.

 

With the increasing trends toward an internationalization of trade and a convergence towards macro-technologies in multi-national production units, the explanation offered by the four economists suggest that agents of the deep state will maintain control over the pace of technical change as a tool to control economic growth that benefits their own corporate interests.

The elected leaders and agents in the deep stated do not have a fiduciary allegiance toward the promotion of self-sustaining national economic growth.

Madison’s constitution did not require that of the elites.

His constitution failed to state, in the Preamble, whose interests the deep state agents were supposed to represent.

His rules were designed to establish rules of civil procedure to adjudicate conflicts between the two social classes, not promote maximum individual freedom and economic growth.

Part 4. The National Economic Sovereignty and The Natural Rights Constitution of the Liberty States of America.

The public purpose in an individualist society is served by promotion and adherence to common external values of trust, fair dealing, truthful representations, and promise keeping.

Voluntary cooperation between individuals occurs when the individuals assume, prior to entering into any political or financial exchange process, that other citizens share these common cultural and political values.

As Buchanan points out, voluntary allegiance to the rule of law results from the realization that it is in one’s best interest for his or her life’s mission to be consistent with the public purpose of the rule of law.

The entire edifice of voluntary compliance to the rule of law is built on the principles stated in the Preamble of the Natural Rights Constitution of the Liberty States of America. The Preamble states:

We, the citizens of the Liberty States of America, establish this constitutional contract between our respective states and the National Government of the Liberty States of America.

We solemnly swear and affirm that we establish this contract to preserve and protect the natural and civil rights of citizens in each state, and to protect and defend the sovereignty of each state and the nation, from foreign and domestic threats.

It is from this Preamble that the Constitutional rules that follow promote individual freedom and the national economic sovereignty.

The economic rules create the conditions for resolving the four conflicts of interest between a natural rights constitution and Madison’s British mixed government constitution that aims at amelioration of conflicts between two social classes.

  • Open flows of technological information to create a wide range of new ventures.
  • Open flows of venture capital to create maximum rates of new venture creation.
  • Maximum rate of technical change to create maximum knowledge diffusion.
  • Maximum individual freedom, reward based upon individual merit to create a “sympathetic environment” for risk-taking.

The natural rights constitution has 11 provisions which establish the framework of economic freedom:

  1. The National Congress shall have the power to issue government bonds, and to borrow money on the credit of the Liberty States of America. All proposals to borrow money or issue debt shall occur once in the two year budget cycle, and all proposals to issue debt must be approved by 50% of the State legislatures of the Liberty States of America, no later than January 21 of the year of issuance.
  2. The term of debt and interest on any issuance of debt shall not exceed 10 years, and must be paid in full by the end of the 10th year.
  3. The National Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce and approve trade agreements with foreign nations, which are negotiated by the President.
  4. The National Congress shall have the power to establish a uniform rule of citizen naturalization, and provide revenues for national border security to prohibit illegal entrance into the sovereign nation or any sovereign state.
  5. The National Congress shall have the power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, regulate the circulation and creation of money and money instruments, regulate the national banking system and establish the currency value of foreign coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures.
  6. The National Congress shall have the power to provide for the punishment for the national criminal felony of counterfeiting the securities and money of the Liberty States of America.
  7. The National Congress shall have the power to establish a national Post Office and a national system of roads and transportation routes.
  8. The National Congress shall have the power to authorize regional capital securities markets, and to establish regulatory guidelines for the operation of regional private and public security exchanges designed to promote maximum national and regional economic growth rates.
  9. The National Congress shall have the power to establish and maintain a national patent office to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
  10. The National Congress shall have the power to protect the patents of citizens from foreign and domestic criminal usurpation of the right of citizens to enjoy the benefits of their invention.
  11. The National Congress shall have the power to define and punish intellectual property piracies and criminal patent felonies committed against citizens of the Liberty States of America by foreign and domestic criminals.

Three of the rules are aimed at protecting intellectual property rights of inventors and entrepreneurs, so that they can reap their rewards from their individual creativity and initiative.

One of the provisions aims at creating a new capital market infrastructure in each major metro region that raises and directs capital investment into the new ventures within that region.

Three of the provisions aim at the creation and management of a stable national monetary system that limits the ability of the agents of government from unstable monetary policy.

A stable national monetary policy provides the institutional context of financial stability for the entrepreneur as he makes his guesses about the future demand for his products.

Money supply is linked to technical change through its effect on the entrepreneur’s expectations on the future.

As long as the entrepreneur can see the conditions of monetary stability, he has the confidence to make his guess and move forward with his capital investment into a very uncertain future.

Conclusion.

The Natural Rights Constitution of the Liberty States of America promotes a relationship between the cultural values that support individual freedom and technological change that causes national economic growth.

The shared cultural values are commonly-held external values of trust, fair dealing, truthful representations, and promise keeping.

Citizens in America today do not share common cultural values. Madison’s constitution devolved into an unelected, unaccountable tyranny that advocates globalism, not the sovereign national economic interest.

In other words, there are not two political parties that represent distinct social classes, as intended by Madison’s British mixed government model.

Both political parties, for different reasons, promote globalization of the American economy, to the detriment of the sovereign national economic interest.

National economic growth is caused by capital investments in technical change made by entrepreneurs in new production units that create new interindustry relationships and new market relationships that did not exist before.

Voluntary allegiance to the rule of law, in the natural rights republic results from the fact that all citizens have an equal opportunity for upward mobility and individual prosperity.

The Natural Rights Constitution promotes allegiance to the rule of law by protecting an individual’s God-given natural right to pursue their own happiness.

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